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Abstract
In this experimental study of tax evasion and its determinants partici-
pants earn their income in a complex stochastic intertemporal environment
including the possibility to invest into a risky asset. The earned income
has to be declared in four tax returns which are randomly verified. If tax
evasion is detected, penalty depends on evaded taxes. Twice the tax rev-
enue is donated to charity organizations. Our main results show that higher
income induces tax fraud and that gender differences exist.
∗We are especially grateful to Prof. Dr.Werner Güth for helpful comments and useful sugges-
tions. We are greatly indebted to Dr.Vital Anderhub, who developed the software used in the
experiment, for his invaluable input. The financial support of the Deutsche Forschungsgemein-
schaft (SFB 373, C5) and TMR-project “Savings and Pensions” by the European Commission
is gratefully acknowledged. All errors and opinions are of course our own.
1. Introduction
In Germany, as well as elsewhere, the phenomenon of tax evasion behavior is
continually on the rise. Actually, 7,969 judgements and orders of summary pun-
ishment referring to taxes from income and property and taxes on transaction
imposed in 19981 are connected with tax fraud. They include 1, 492 years of im-
prisonment and a total amount of 88, 378, 073 DM in fines2. These proceedings
counter the underlying sum of 1, 160, 306, 937 DM in evaded taxes3. Surely, one
can imagine the loss in tax revenue, which the government has to compensate.
The problem becomes worse because more and more citizens seem to get used to
consume public goods without contributing. Defining a tax evader as a freerider4,
who claims public services at the expense of others, it must surprise that the
society does not challenge such behavior fundamentally. A survey conducted by
Schmölders (1964)5 revealed that 50% of the interrogated individuals mark a tax
evader as a “peccadillo”, whereas only 20% voted for “larcenist”, and 3% in each
case chose the extreme positions “man of honor” or “criminal”.
Furthermore, the survey from Kirchler (1998), where tax evaders were described
as clever and honest taxpayers as stupid and lazy, shows other circumstantial
evidence for low tax morality. The results elucidate decreasing tax morality which
means the taxpayer’s attitude towards tax offences, the system of taxation, and
tax application.
It seems commonly accepted among psychologists that individuals perceive taxes
as an evil6. The non-acceptance of the system increases dramatically. Several
arguments could be:
• an unnecessarily complicated, instead of a clear and fair, tax law
1see BMF (1999)
2According to German tax law (§ 370 Abgabenordnung) tax evasion is a crime.
3These cases of detected tax evasion represent only the tip of the iceberg.
4see Van de Braak (1993), Williamson and Wearing (1996), Bosco and Mittone (1997)
5see Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1964)
6see Kottke (1991)
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• improper tax application through the public authorities
• budgetary expansionism.
Because of the importance of tax cheating, it is necessary to understand the
determinants of tax evasion and their effects on tax morality.
In recent years there has been a growing attention on tax evasion behavior in
economics, sociology, psychology, political science, and law. Theoretical investi-
gations, surveys of representative citizens and experimental studies were used to
shed light on evasion behavior. Frequently, while investigating the impact of tax
rate, auditing probability, income, and penalty rate the standard model of tax
evasion (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972, Srinivasan, 1973, Yitzhaki, 1974) seems
to view the evasion decision as a problem of expected utility maximization7.
However, empirical and experimental investigations often disclose considerable de-
viation between taxpayers’ actual and optimal behavior. According to Clotfelter
(1983) tax evasion increases with tax rates in contrast to Yitzhaki’s (1974) the-
oretical analysis who assumes that penalties increase with the amount of evaded
taxes. Friedland et al. (1978), Kaplan and Reckers (1985), and Baldry (1986)
showed that, unlike in the expected utility maximization, some taxpayers do not
evade even if tax evasion is more than a fair gamble. This implies that economic
factors are not sufficient to reveal the whole phenomenon of tax evasion.
Therefore, many studies examine various socioeconomic and psychological factors
in order to enrich the economic model. In their pioneering study Friedland et
al. (1978) analyze economic and socioeconomic factors (e.g. age, gender, marital
status, and ethnic background among others). Numerous experimental studies
investigate psychological factors and their influences on evasion decisions, such as
perceived inequity of the tax system (see e.g. Spicer and Becker, 1980, Webley,
Morris, and Amstutz, 1985, Hite, 1990), perceived opportunity of tax cheating
(see e.g. Robben et al., 1990), and the influence of the number of tax evaders
7see Theoretical Framework
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personally known and experiences with auditing and punishment (see e.g. Spicer
and Lundstedt, 1976, Spicer and Hero, 1985).
The following experimental study examines the influences of variable income, gen-
der, analytic capabilities, and the attitude towards risk on tax declaration behav-
ior.
Experimental investigations are useful but not the only method to explore the
determinants of tax evasion behavior. Many studies are based on surveys which,
because of numerous methodical defects, should be interpreted carefully. It seems
possible that interviewed individuals do not remember former declaration deci-
sions perfectly. Subtle questions could be left unanswered or at least not truth-
fully answered if someone feels threatened. Moreover, data of surveys are generally
difficult to interpret if individuals are asked to report on former evasion activi-
ties or on actions that reveal their attitudes towards tax evasion. None of those
studies were able to give information on precise tax rates, penalties, and auditing
variables.
In contrast, experimental investigations allow a detailed examination of the cur-
rent tax morality and their influencing variables because they allow us to introduce
independent variables and to exclude irrelevant variables. Thus one makes the
causalities more transparent. Besides, experiments offer the possibility to observe
the individual’s real tax evasion behavior which is normally illegal or undesirable
in society.
The price of the experimental method is the artificial situation which makes it
difficult to generalize results on tax evasion behavior8. Participants’ behavior may
differ from reality, e.g. by assessing the experiment as a pure game. Baldry (1987)
pointed out rightly “... it cannot be automatically presumed that they therefore
act in a game differently from the way they would act in the real business of tax
evasion (which some taxpayers may treat as a game as well!)”.
All in all, to examine individual evasion behavior, experiments are extremely
attractive and becoming more and more popular. Regarding cost and time, ex-
perimental studies can be more effective than surveys.
8In experimental economics one discusses this as “parallelism”, see e.g. Smith (1982).
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2. Theoretical Framework
The standard theory of tax evasion is based on the model of Allingham and
Sandmo (1972)9. It is supposed that a taxpayer has already made all of the de-
cisions which influence his taxable income. The taxpayer is confronted with two
alternatives: (1) true declaration or (2) concealment of a fixed amount. It is
possible to define tax evasion as a special form of gambling, a decision under un-
certainty maximizing expected utility10. This basic model comes to the following
predictions: Declared income increases with rising probability of detection and
penalties. The influence of gross income and tax rate depends on the taxpayer’s
attitude towards risk11.
One problem of these theoretical analyses is indicated by Yitzhaki (1974): If it is
assumed that penalties are imposed on the amount of tax evaded12 and absolute
risk aversion is declining, the model predicts that higher tax rates will lead to
decreased tax evasion. Intuitively and verified by empirical results an increasing
evasion seems to be realistic13. Another problem is the assumption that a taxpayer
maximizes his expected utility according to the von Neumann/Morgenstern ax-
ioms14. This theory is often criticized because of descriptive misfits15 and refutable
assumptions16.
Therefore, there is a good reason to suppose that the Prospect Theory (Kahne-
mann and Tversky, 1979), which can be viewed as an extension to the expected
utility theory, seems more suitable to predict decisions under risk and uncertainty.
Now the expected income is not the only determinant of the utility function. The
form can be influenced by the taxpayer’s evaluation of gains and losses (taxpaying
9Srinivasan (1973) worked out a nearly similar model at the same time.
10The only variable in the expected utility function is the expexted income.
11The basic model was extended in different ways. See, e.g., Pencavel (1979), Sandmo (1981),
Cowell (1985), Alm (1988), and Myles and Naylor (1996). Cowell (1990) provides an interesting
overview of the theoretical models.
12This fixing of penalties seems to be more realistic, see the tax systems in the USA or
Germany.
13see e.g. Benjamini and Maital (1985)
14see von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947), for other axioms see, e.g., Luce and Raiffa (1957)
15see e.g. Frey and Eichenberger (1989)
16see e.g. Allais (1953), Laux (1998)
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as a loss or a reduced gain) in relation to a reference point. Another difference to
the von Neumann/Morgenstern axioms is the overestimation of small probabili-
ties by decision makers. However, this approach does not consider nonfinancial
aspects as arguments of the utility function.
The dilemma can be outlined as follows: Noneconomic variables of the taxpayers’
theoretical calculations threaten to falsify the original models. But investigating
only financial targets fails to explain the observed correlations. To show that
tax evasion is not a pure gamble the following questions should be examined by
experimental investigations:
• Does higher income induce tax evasion?
• Provided that there are gender differences in attitude towards risk, what are
the distinctions in evasion and investment behavior?
• Do risky investments crowd out tax evasion?
• What influences do monitoring, penalties and cleverness have on declaration
behavior?
3. Experimental Design
Our experiment consists of two parts. In the computerized first part participants
earn their income by playing the “saving game” (similar to Anderhub et al.,
mimeo). In contrast to randomly assigned income levels, they must earn it17.
The saving game is a complex stochastic intertemporal allocation task (Anderhub
et al., 1999) involving a risky investment (Anderhub et al., mimeo). It guarantees
variable earnings which makes it possible to make an analysis of several income
levels.
17based on the idea of Webley et al. (1991) who let participants earn their incomes before
tax declaring
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The participants have to distribute a given monetary amount of S = 11.92 ECU
(1 Experimental Currency Unit = DM .03) over an uncertain number of periods.
The minimum is 3 and the maximum is 6 periods (t = 1, 2, ..., T ; 3 ≤ T ≤ 6).










Additional to the 1st consumption choice x1 with 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 11.92 participants are
able to invest a share i of S − x1 in a risky asset where 0 ≤ i ≤ S − x1. With









i in the 2nd period. This means
S2 = 11.92− x1 + i
3




S2 = 11.92− x1 − i
3




In each case after the 1st and after the 2nd period one of the three dice is eliminated.
From the 3rd period on participants know which die (and its probability) randomly




xt = x1 · x2 · ... · xT .
In case of termination all saved money is lost. Because of uncertain lifetime there
is a basic rationality requirement18 participants should satisfy:
xt > xt+1 for t ≥ 3.
18There is a boundary solution for t ≥ 4 when the optimal investment is lost and the red
or yellow die applies. Now the optimal decision is represented by xt = xt+1 = 0. None of the
participants satisfied this criterion.
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A play x1, i, x2, ..., xT is called a round r. Participants play altogether 12 such
rounds (r = 1, ..., 12). The second part of our experiment relies on pen and paper.
After each third of the altogether 12 rounds participants have to declare their
income (accumulated payoff in the three preceding rounds of the saving game).
This intertemporal context allows to examine the existence of constant behavior.
On the cover page of the declaration form (see Appendix B) some personal data
(age, gender, religion, intended profession, study and semester) was to be filled in.
In addition participants were able to choose a charity organization which receives
twice their tax payments. This form of public spending should induce feelings
of guilt in the case of evasion19. In the view of the participants taxes are not
wasted20.
On the second page (see Appendix B, 1st tax declaration form) participants have
to declare their income21. The tax table (see Appendix C) shows tax dues and
penalties.
Each declaration was checked with an audit probability of 1
3
. Let G denote the
real accumulated payoff in the three preceding rounds of the saving game, Ĝ the
declared one, T (·) the tax function, T̂ the evaded tax, i.e. T̂ = T (G)−T (Ĝ), and
P the penalty. Then the payoff from three rounds after tax declaration is
G− T (Ĝ) in case of no monitoring
G− T (Ĝ) for Ĝ = G
G− T (G)− P for Ĝ < G
)
in case of monitoring
In case of monitoring and tax evasion
P =

50 if 0 < T̂ ≤ 30
75 if 30 < T̂ ≤ 60
100 if 60 < T̂ ≤ 90
125 if 90 < T̂ ≤ 120
150 if T̂ > 120
19By doubling we provide an incentive to “donate” via taxes.
20Monetary transfers to charity organizations were introduced by Ahlert (1996) to give them
an ethical appeal.
21Whereas they were able to cheat !
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Penalties are not donated to charity organizations. Participants know that penal-
ties are collected by the “revenue authorities”22. Before starting the saving game
for the next three rounds, each participant is fully informed about the monitoring
of his last declaration.
A short postexperimental questionnaire (see Appendix D) examines the attitude
towards tax justice and evasion. To reveal participant’s willingness of risk-taking
a simple lottery is added.
38 students of Humboldt-University in Berlin took part in altogether 4 sessions
(10 + 12 + 7+ 9). Most participants (19 female, 19 male) were student beginners
(2nd semester). The experiment took about one hour, average earning amounts
to ECU 353.35 (DM 10.60).
4. Results
For evaluation we have 152 tax declaration forms (38 participants with 4 declara-
tions each). 108 of 152 (71.05%) are truthful, 39 of 152 (25.66%) committed tax
fraud23 and a considerable share of 5 of 152 (3.29%) are overdeclarations24.
Gross “national” income, generated by playing the “saving game”, amounts to
18, 227.02 ECU. Only 1, 856.23 ECU (40.89%) of the thereby resulting real tax
burden (4, 539.72 ECU) were paid. Figure IV.1. presents the real income before
taxes, the real tax burden, and the declared taxes (arranged by income).
22Penalized tax evasion should not generate a clear conscience.
23Only in 111 of 152 cases is the income G larger than the tax-exempt amount of 60 ECU!
24Possible reasons could be misunderstanding of the task, spelling mistakes or flaws in one’s
















code number (arranged by income)
median income = 408.81 ECU
tax fraud real tax burden income before tax
Figure IV.1: Tax burden and evaded taxes depending on income
Table IV.1. demonstrates different tax evasion behavior (tax evaders25 and par-
ticipants who declare always honestly) of participants who earned a high (GΣ >
408.81 ECU) or low (GΣ < 408, 81 ECU) income as well as for female and male
(19 participants in both cases). When tax fraud is negative, this reveals overdec-
laration.
number of number of all cases
tax evaders honestly declaring
low income (GΣ < 408.81) 5(27.8%) 14(70.0%) 19
high income (GΣ > 408.81) 13(72.2%) 6(30.0%) 19
18(100%) 20(100%) 38
female 6(33.3%) 13(65.0%) 19
male 12(66.7%) 7(35.0%) 19
18(100%) 20(100%) 38
Table IV.1: Tax evasion depending on income and gender
25participants who evaded at least once
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To test how income influences tax evasion, we exclude overdeclarations (5) as
well as all cases of real accumulated income G of the three preceding rounds
with G ≤ 60 ECU (honesty cannot be assumed automatically because of missing
possibility to cheat), yielding a total sample of 111 declaration forms. Using
the t-test the hypothesis that there is no difference in average taxable income
of evaders and non-evaders must be rejected (p = .000). In view of Table IV.1
honesty becomes rare when income increases what justifies
Regularity 1: Tax evasion increases significantly with income.
As another determinant of tax evasion we examine gender. With regard to former
results of Anderhub et al. (1999) we realize that men tend to evade more than
women do (see Table IV.1). Men tried to evade 2, 432.54 ECU (75.07%) of their
real tax burden (3, 240.51 ECU), whereas women tried to evade “only” 250.95
ECU (19.32%). In view of Table IV.1 we conclude
Regularity 2: Men underdeclare significantly more often than women and they
cheat to a larger extent.
To check the H0-hypothesis of independence between gender and evasion, we
exclude all overdeclarations and data with G ≤ 60 ECU (see above). Regularity
2 is confirmed by the chi-square-test (p = .000). Former experimental results by
Friedland et al. (1978) and Güth and Mackscheidt (mimeo), which concluded
that women underdeclare more often than men but when they cheat they do it to
a lower extent, are not fully supported.
The following paragraphs examine a few possible factors that may explain different
declaration behavior of women and men such as income, willingness of risk-taking,
and expected utility maximization. Table IV.2. reveals different income levels




low income (GΣ < 408.81) 13(68.4%) 6(31.6%)
high income (GΣ > 408.81) 6(31.6%) 13(68.4%)
19(100%) 19(100%)
Table IV.2: Income depending on gender
With an average gross income of 380.34 ECU, women earn significantly less than
men, who have earned on average 578.98 ECU26(t-test; p = .011). Income levels
are determined by each person’s willingness of risk-taking while playing the saving
game. As a measure of that we compared chosen investments per round (mean
investment = ∅i = 5.77 ECU, optimal investment i∗ = 9.93 ECU), realizing that
the investment behavior of women is quite different from the one of men.
female male
low investment (i < 5.77) 141(61.8%) 83 (36.4%)
high investment (i > 5.77) 87 (38.2%) 145(63.6%)
228(100%) 228(100%)
Table IV.3: Investment per round depending on gender
Using the t-test the H0-hypothesis of no different investment behavior must be
rejected (p = .000).
Regularity 3: Referring to the investment decisions, women behave less risky
(mean investment = 4.51) than men (mean investment = 7.02).
Women, who invest less tend to express a high willingness to pay for a trivial
lottery27. Men showed a positive correlation.
26all earnings before tax
27For gender differences in risk attitudes concerning financial decision-making see also Schu-


























Figure IV.2: Correlation between investment and lottery (women)
Rounds which end with an evasion decision show an average investment of 7.77
ECU, whereas honest taxpayers invest on average 4.83 ECU (rounds with G ≤
60 ECU are excluded). Table IV.4 reveals the relationship between investment,
income, and tax declaring type. In 42 of 57 cases, participants who made low
average investments earned a lower income than those who invested more than
5.77 ECU. Cases of high investment (low investment) and low income (high
income) could be caused by bad (good) luck while playing the “saving game”
or by making less clever consumption choices. Table IV.4 underlies Regularity
1. Participants of group A tend significantly more often to evade taxes than
participants of group C. Comparing the tax declaration behavior of the groups C
and D (∅i < 5.77 ECU)
Regularity 6: Honest taxpayers make significantly lower investments
is justified (t-test, p = .000). According to group A, high investments do not
crowd out tax evasion, contrary to group B. One possible reason for the behavior
in group B is e.g. that tax evasion would not pay because of missing incentive to
evade according to maximization of expected payoff.
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tax declaring type
investment income group never at least once all cases
high high(GΣ > 408.81) A 11(30.6%) 25(69.4%) 36(100%)
∅i > 5.77 ECU low(GΣ < 408.81) B 15(83.3%) 3(16.7%) 18(100%)
low high(GΣ > 408.81) C 7(46.7%) 8(53.3%) 15(100%)
∅i < 5.77 ECU low(GΣ < 408.81) D 39(92.9%) 3(7.1%) 42(100%)
all cases 72(64.9%) 39(35.1%) 111(100%)
Table IV.4: Tax declaring type depending on investments
Now we examine the relation between behavior in the “saving game” and the
related tax declaring type as another determinant of tax evasion. According to
the observation of the basic rationality requirement (see above), Table IV.6 illus-
trates the comparison between hard-core nonevaders and those participants who
underdeclared at least once. Except for the simple case of x3 > x4 participants
who “never” underdeclare do not meet the requirement if it gets more complex.
tax declaring type
never at least once all cases
4 periods (x3 > x4) 49/62(79.0%) 30/41(73.2%) 79/103
5 periods (x3 > x4 > x5) 12/26(46.2%) 23/36(63.9%) 35/62
6 periods (x3 > x4 > x5 > x6) 25/85(29.4%) 31/73(42.5%) 56/158
all cases 86/173 84/150 170/323
(49.7%) (56.0%) (52.6%)
Table IV.5: Basic rationality requirements
This justifies
Regularity 5: Honest taxpayers are slightly less clever than tax evaders
which is supported by Table IV.6. There we subdivide the tax declaring type “at
least once” into “sometimes” and “always”. The average payoff per round and
the average investment values are used as indicators of attitudes towards risk and
of cleverness, nevertheless this is also depending on luck. The average number of
different x1, i, and x1 + i values shows the relation between tax declaring type
and constancy of behavior.
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tax declaring type
never sometimes always all cases
∅payoff per round (ECU) 30.92 45.77 56.73 39.97
∅ i-values 4.75 5.96 8.35 5.77
number of different i-values 2.90 3.18 3.14 3.03
number of different x1—values 3.60 4.27 3.57 3.69
number of different x1 + i-values 3.95 3.91 3.29 3.82
Table IV.6: Declaring type and the “saving game”
Clear results about the influences of audits (and penalties) as determinants of
the evasion decision have not been noted due to the high percentage of hard-core
nonevaders and many taxable incomes G with G ≤ 60 ECU. Remarkable is that
only 3 audited participants changed from underdeclaring to truthfully declaring
and that 3 did it in the opposite way.
In the analysis of penalty-classes, a difference in maximizing the expected payoff
when declaring income can be seen. According to Figure IV.3, the expected
payoff is not maximized in 53.85% of all evasion decisions whereas this is true for
75.00% of all honest declarations28. Increasing complexity of maximizing in the
evasion case could be one reason. Tax evasion rises with income (see above) and
participants have to consider penalty-classes.
A regression analysis reveals that the best prediction (adjusted R2 = .714, F-test,
p = .000) of the amount of evaded tax as dependent variable is given by income
(t-test, p = .000) and gender (t-test, p = .012).29
The differences in the expected payoff maximization of the individuals increase
with income. 79.17% of all declarations (with G > 60 ECU) by participants
with GΣ < 408.81 ECU (median income) and only 53.97% for GΣ > 408.81 ECU
correspond to expected payoff maximization.
28only with G > 60 ECU, see above






















optimal declarations declarations truthful declarations
Figure IV.3: Declaration decisions and the maximized expected payoff
Figure IV.3 clearly reveals non-or-all behavior concerning the tax declarations.
This means a taxpayer either declares honestly or conceals all of his real tax due
T (G). Only 10 of 111 cases (9.01%) deviate from this strategy30.
The following figure which is derived from Figure IV.3 shows the distribution
of honest declarations and underdeclarations for different income levels. This
underlines Regularity 1, which states that the share of underdeclarations rises
with income.


















honest dec larations underdec larations
Figure IV.4: Declaration behavior depending on income levels
5. Conclusion
In this experimental study of tax evasion and its determinants participants earn
their income by solving a complex stochastic intertemporal allocation problem.
Taxes are not wasted since twice the individual tax revenue was donated to
the following charity organizations31: Red Cross (25.19%), World Wildlife Fund
(16.46%), German Animal Protectionists (2.67%), UNICEF (20.98%), and Sup-
porters of Humboldt University’s Economics Faculty (34.7%).
The responses of the post-experimental questionnaire reveal that only 5.3% of the
participants assess the German tax system as fair. The violation of the ability-
to-pay principle caused by too many “loopholes” was often criticized. 55.6% of
the 18 participants who are less satisfied with government services evaded taxes
at least once. 36.8% voted for the statement that tax evaders take a high risk.
Most of the participants who disapproved (83.3%) evaded at least once, whereas
31Note that there is no significant relationship between chosen organization and declaration
decision.
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21.4% of the participants who approved evaded taxes. If participants neither
approved nor disapproved (26.3%), half of them evaded taxes. Actually, 57.9% of
the participants have not handed in a real tax declaration before.
This paper uses data from a laboratory experiment to examine the determinants of
tax evasion, such as income, gender, risky investments, cleverness, and experiences
with audits or punishment.
One main result of this study is that tax evasion appears to depend on income
and gender. The higher a participant’s income is the more likely is tax evasion.
Experiences with audits or fines did not reveal a significant influence on tax eva-
sion behavior. A large proportion of the participants were hard-core nonevaders.
On average they earned less than those participants who evaded taxes. Their
honesty is probably due to the conscience, threatened fines or financial loss, or
knowledge about the consequences for the state. An important fact is that more
hard-core nonevaders made an optimal tax declaration concerning the expected
payoff than tax evaders (see Figure IV.3), but in regard of investments and the
basic rationality requirement which provides more complexity this did not apply.
Participants with a high income had to take several penalty-classes into consider-
ation, which made their declaration decision more complex. It is highly probable
that the more complex a task is the more decisions differ from the expected payoff
maximization and the more they are guided by rules of thumb.
According to the gender effect, it was noticeable that women made lower invest-
ments and that they earned lower incomes. Table V.1 reveals that this seems to
result from attitudes towards risk but not from less cleverness.
gender
female male all cases
4 periods (x3 > x4) 47/59(79.7%) 32/44(72.7%) 79/103
5 periods (x3 > x4 > x5) 21/30(70.0%) 14/32(43.8%) 35/62
6 periods (x3 > x4 > x5 > x6) 29/83(34.9%) 27/75(36.0%) 56/158
all cases 97/172 73/151 170/323
(56.4%) (48.3%) (52.6%)
Table V.1: Basic rationality requirements according to gender
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Women are more honest in paying taxes than men and even when they cheated
they did it to a lower extent. Experimental data should be interpreted carefully
as to derive implications for reality. Nevertheless, we found an interesting cor-
relation: Of the 14,025 judgments concerning tax fraud in 1997 11,562 (82.4%)
referred to men and 2,463 (17.6%) referred to women (see Statistisches Bunde-
samt, 1998). Our data identified a nearly identical distribution. 79.5% of the 39
underdeclarations go back to men and 20.5% to women32.
The findings support that a single focus upon the influences of economic factors
will not provide a specification of tax evasion behavior. Not only economic factors,
but also socioeconomic and psychological factors seem to have an effect on tax
declaring behavior. Future studies hold promise for explaining exactly the roles
played by these factors.
32Note that these are only quantitative statements not including the amounts evaded.
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6. Appendix A — Instructions
Instructions
This experiment consists of two parts. First, you will participate in a computer
experiment. The gains represent your income which has to be declared in a
tax return. Altogether the experiment lasts 12 rounds where every single round
consists of at least three and at most 6 Periods. After every three rounds there is
a break and you have to fill out the tax return.
Please, read now the instructions for the computer experiment, the information
about the tax return is provided when you get the tax return.
Part 1 - Computer
These instructions will be available on your screen via the menu item “Game/Instructions”.
To quit the instructions, click the small green square in the upper left corner of
this window or press <Esc>.
Each of the following rounds has the same course. You are able to earn income
in ECU (Experimental Currency Unit). Your task in every round is to distribute
an amount of money as good as possible over several periods. The better you
do this, the higher is your payoff. In addition, you can invest any amount of the
remaining money in the first period to a profitable but risky prospect, in order
to enlarge your disposable amount in period 2 when you are lucky or to reduce
it when you are unlucky. All amounts which are not spent during one round are
lost.
Your payoff is determined by the product of all amounts you have spent in the
periods you actually reached. For example, if you have reached exactly four
periods, your payoff is determined by:
Payoff from the round G = x1 · x2 · x3 · x4.
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If you have reached all six periods, your payoff is:
Payoff from the round G = x1 · x2 · x3 · x4 · x5 · x6.
The difficulty is, that there is no certainty about the number of periods you have
to distribute your money. The game can last for three, four, five, or six periods.
Every round will last at least three periods. Whether you reach the fourth, fifth,
or sixth period, will be determined by throwing a die. There are altogether three
different dice with the colors red, yellow, and green. The following table shows,
in which cases you reach the next period.
Color of die no further period new period




The number of periods of one round cannot be higher than six. At the beginning
of a round you do not know which die is used for you. You get this information
after you have made some decisions. The general course of the game is as follows:
1st period) You will get a total amount of money S = 11.92 ECU, which you can
spend in the coming periods. Altogether you can only spend this total amount.
You can choose an amount x1, which you want to spend in the first period. Think
very carefully, how much you want to spent and howmuch you want to save for the
following periods. In addition, you have (only) in the first period the opportunity
to invest any amount of the remaining money S − x1. You choose an amount i
with 0 ≤ i ≤ S−x1. Now a die is thrown. If the die shows 1, 2, 3, or 4 the amount
invested will be enlarged by 1/3. If the die shows 5 or 6 the amount invested will
be reduced by 1/3. Accordingly, your disposable amount for the second is higher
or lower. After your decision one of the three dice is excluded. Now you know,
that only the two other dice are candidates for the chance to move on to the
fourth, fifth, and sixth period.
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2nd period) You are choosing an amount x2, which you want to spend in the
second period. You cannot spend more than you have left from the total amount
after the first period. After your decision another die is excluded. Now you know,
which die remains to be thrown for the fourth, fifth, and sixth period.
3rd period) You are choosing an amount x3, which you want to spend in the
third period. After this decision the computer will throw the remaining die in
order to decide whether you reach the fourth period. If you do not reach the
fourth period, the round ends here. The amount which is not spent until now is
lost.
4th period) If you have reached the fourth period, you choose an amount x4. For
reaching the fifth period, the die will be thrown again.
5th period) If you have reached the fifth period, you choose an amount x5. For
reaching the sixth period, the die will be thrown again.
6th period) If you have reached the sixth period, you do not have to make a
decision, because all remaining money is spent automatically.
Your payoff is calculated by the product of all the amounts that you have spent in
the periods you reached. For instance, if you have finished exactly four periods,
your payoff is determined by G = x1 · x2 · x3 · x4. When you have reached, for
instance, all six periods, your payoff is determined by G = x1 · x2 · x3 · x4 · x5 · x6
where x6 is the amount you have left after the fifth period. Please think about
the following: If you spend in one period an amount of 0, your payoff will be also
0 because one of the factors is 0. This can happen, for instance, if you spend all
money in the fourth period and reach the sixth period. Then you have to spend 0
in the fifth and perhaps also in the sixth period and therefore you get the payoff
0. You have to weigh the risk of spending all your money early or making your
money useless if the game ends.
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Part 2 — Tax return
Please fill in the tax return cover truthfully.
You have played 3 rounds of the experiment at the computer and you have received
a payoff each round. Clicking the menu item “Game” and “Protocol”, you will
find your various payoffs up to now. At the end of the “Protocol” you will find
the sum of the (last) 3 payoffs. This is your earned profit before tax that you
have to declare. Your tax due is shown on the tax table. All in all, you fill in four
tax returns.
Please note that there is a tax table, showing the tax rate for each personal income.
Your tax return will be checked with a probability of 1/3 by throwing a die. Only
if the die shows “1” or “6” your tax return will be checked. In case of detected
tax fraud you will have to pay a fixed penalty depending on the evaded taxes in
addition to your personal tax. Your income will be:
I = earnings− penalty− tax
Penalty (ECU) =

50 if 0 < evaded tax (ECU) ≤ 30
75 if 30 < evaded tax (ECU) ≤ 60
100 if 60 < evaded tax (ECU) ≤ 90
125 if 90 < evaded tax (ECU) ≤ 120
150 if evaded tax (ECU) > 120
Your declaration will be acknowledged automatically in case of tax evasion, but
no monitoring. The personal tax due will then be as declared. If your income
≤ 60 ECU there exists no tax due.
If you declared correctly, you will have to pay the declared tax in case of moni-
toring and no monitoring as well. Your income now is:
26
I = earned income− tax
Twice the tax revenue will be donated to charity, whereas penalties are sunk costs
of the tax authorities. Select your preferred charity organization while filling in
the cover of the declaration form.
Before and after the 2nd part of the experiment you will be asked to answer some
questions concerning your person and the experiment. Among other things, we
are going to ask you whether certain personal attributes apply to you. You will be
presented several scales, each of them labelled with two extreme characteristics.
You are then asked to click the position between the extremes which matches
your personality best. All of your statements are anonymous, only your code
number (but not your name) is assigned to your data. Please answer truthfully
and completely. The rate of exchange is 1 ECU=.03 DM.
If you have any questions concerning the experiment, please raise your hand.
We will try to answer your questions privately. Please do not speak with your
neighbors, any communication with them would make the data useless for us. In
this case we would have to exclude you from participation and could not pay you.
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Appendix B — Declaration Form (cover page)
28
1st Tax Declaration Form (round 1—3)




inspection true income penalty real tax sum
yes no
29
Appendix C — Tax Tables
For income > 300ECU : tax = 0.5(income− 60ECU). Round up your income to
the values in the table.
income tax rate tax income tax rate tax income tax rate tax
0-60 0% 0.00 171 50% 55.50 282 50% 111.00
63 20% 0.60 174 50% 57.00 285 50% 112.50
66 21% 1.26 177 50% 58.50 288 50% 114.00
69 22% 1.98 180 50% 60.00 291 50% 115.50
72 23% 2.76 183 50% 61.50 294 50% 117.00
75 24% 3.60 186 50% 63.00 297 50% 118.50
78 25% 4.50 189 50% 64.50 300 50% 120.00
81 26% 5.46 192 50% 66.00
84 27% 6.48 195 50% 67.50
87 28% 7.56 198 50% 69.00
90 29% 8.70 201 50% 70.50
93 30% 9.90 204 50% 72.00
96 31% 11.16 207 50% 73.50
99 32% 12.48 210 50% 75.00
102 33% 13.86 213 50% 76.50
105 34% 15.30 216 50% 78.00
108 35% 16.80 219 50% 79.50
111 36% 18.36 222 50% 81.00
114 37% 19.98 225 50% 82.50
117 38% 21.66 228 50% 84.00
120 39% 23.40 231 50% 85.50
123 40% 25.20 234 50% 87.00
126 41% 27.06 237 50% 88.50
129 42% 28.98 240 50% 90.00
132 43% 30.96 243 50% 91.50
135 44% 33.00 246 50% 93.00
138 45% 35.10 249 50% 94.50
141 46% 37.26 252 50% 96.00
144 47% 39.48 255 50% 97.50
147 48% 41.76 258 50% 99.00
150 49% 44.10 261 50% 100.50
153 50% 46.50 264 50% 102.00
156 50% 48.00 267 50% 103.50
159 50% 49.50 270 50% 105.00
162 50% 51.00 273 50% 106.50
165 50% 52.50 276 50% 108.00
168 50% 54.00 279 50% 109.50
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Appendix D — Postexperimental questionnaire
Please answer the following questions by marking it with a cross and give a short
reason for your answer.
is true is wrong
The taxation in Germany is fair. ° ° °
Reason: ...
Tax evaders take a high risk. ° ° °
Reason: ...
I have already done a real tax return. ° ° °
Reflecting to the following lottery, how much are you willing to invest?
• with probability p = 1/3 you will earn 60 ECU
• with probability p = 2/3 you will earn 15 ECU
The lottery starts with a stake from 20 ECU up.
.......................... ECU
(The result is not influencing the payment of the experiment!)
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7. Appendix E — Optimal declaration G∗ (ECU)
G G∗ T (G∗) T (G)− T (G∗) G G∗ T (G∗) T (G)− T (G∗)
0-60 0-60 0.00 0.00 171 60 0.00 55.50
63 63 0.60 0.00 174 60 0.00 57.00
66 66 1.26 0.00 177 60 0.00 58.50
69 69 1.98 0.00 180 60 0.00 60.00
72 72 2.76 0.00 183 69 1.98 59.52
75 75 3.60 0.00 186 75 3.60 59.40
78 78 4.50 0.00 189 78 4.50 60.00
81 81 5.46 0.00 192 84 6.48 59.52
84 84 6.48 0.00 195 87 7.56 59.94
87 87 7.56 0.00 198 93 9.90 59.10
90 90 8.70 0.00 201 96 11.16 59.34
93 93 9.90 0.00 204 99 12.48 59.52
96 96 11.16 0.00 207 60 0.00 73.50
99 99 12.48 0.00 210 60 0.00 75.00
102 102 13.86 0.00 213 60 0.00 76.50
105 105 15.30 0.00 216 60 0.00 78.00
108 108 16.80 0.00 219 60 0.00 79.50
111 111 18.36 0.00 222 60 0.00 81.00
114 114 19.98 0.00 225 60 0.00 82.50
117 117 21.66 0.00 228 60 0.00 84.00
120 120 23.40 0.00 231 60 0.00 85.50
123 60 0.00 25.20 234 60 0.00 87.00
126 60 0.00 27.06 237 60 0.00 88.50
129 60 0.00 28.98 240 60 0.00 90.00
132 66 1.26 29.70 243 69 1.98 89.52
135 75 3.60 29.40 246 75 3.60 89.40
138 81 5.46 29.64 249 78 4.50 90.00
141 87 7.56 29.70 252 84 6.48 89.52
144 93 9.90 29.58 255 87 7.56 89.94
147 99 12.48 29.28 258 93 9.90 89.10
150 60 0.00 44.10 261 96 11.16 89.34
153 60 0.00 46.50 264 99 12.48 89.52
156 60 0.00 48.00 267 60 0.00 103.50
159 60 0.00 49.50 270 60 0.00 105.00
162 60 0.00 51.00 273 60 0.00 106.50
165 60 0.00 52.50 276 60 0.00 108.00
168 60 0.00 54.00 279 60 0.00 109.50
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G G∗ T (G∗) T (G)− T (G∗) G G∗ T (G∗) T (G)− T (G∗)
282 60 0.00 111.00 306 75 3.60 119.40
285 60 0.00 112.50 309 78 4.50 120.00
288 60 0.00 114.00 312 84 6.48 119.52
291 60 0.00 115.50 315 87 7.56 119.94
294 60 0.00 117.00 318 93 9.90 119.10
297 60 0.00 118.50 321 96 11.16 119.34
300 60 0.00 120.00 324 99 12.48 119.52



















































Figure E.1: Optimal income declaration
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